Moiz Ali

The check-cashing gas station: $250K cashed every Friday

Moiz Ali's immigrant family ran gas stations that cashed payroll checks for a 5% fee. One early bounced check ($2,000 from a customer named FM Porter) terrified the broke family, but the service scaled to ~$250,000 cashed on a busy Friday.

“we owned a bunch of gas stations and we would cash checks for people as a service. So if you brought in a check, Sean, and you're like, hey, look, this is my payroll check. It's $200 for this week or $2,000 this week. We would charge you a percentage of that check and give you cash for it. And we would take the check and deposit it into the bank. And by the end of our gas station careers, we were doing this at massive scale. Like one of our stores would cash $250,000 worth of checks on any given Friday.”

Build the brand in 3 days by stealing fonts and colors

To launch Native, Moiz Ali skipped paying for branding: he copied Harry's font and Casper's color palette (both then-hot D2C brands), and built the whole site in about three days.

“I'm going to steal the logo that Harry's has, which is just their name written out in a font. I'm going to do the same thing. I can't steal their colors as well because that would be too too blatant. So I'm just going to steal the colors of another website, which was Casper at the time, because they were doing really well. And so that's how the font and the colors came together to be what Native is today.”

Steal thisSkip the logo designer for a new D2C launch; lift the font from one admired brand and the palette from another, and ship the site in days.

A liquid stock market for residential real estate

Moiz Ali's biggest idea: buy single-family rental homes, sell tradeable shares of each on a platform with a liquid secondary market, and let local entrepreneurs sponsor deals while earning Amazon-style trust reviews from investors.

“I would start with a stock market for all residential real estate. I would say, okay, I'm going to start buying residential real estate and, uh, you know, selling shares. Of that real estate that's rented out. So I'd buy rental homes and I would sell shares of that real estate, sort of like a traditional LP would invest, but I'd make a really liquid market on my site.”

Steal thisFocus on residential not commercial (3-bed/2-bath homes always re-rent), build a liquid secondary market, and let vetted local operators sponsor and get reviewed like Amazon sellers.

A buyers' club that negotiates group SaaS discounts

Moiz Ali pays ~$100/month for a membership that nets him $800/month in SaaS discounts (Mailchimp, Shopify, etc.). He argues niche industries like e-commerce should collectively negotiate lifetime recurring discounts with vendors the way P&G negotiates ad-spend discounts from Facebook.

“Why don't we all negotiate a discount with Yopo or with Okendo or with Postscript or with Klaviyo and say, look, there's gonna be 400 of us together. A lot of us are gonna use this software, but we need a big discount. That's a lifetime, that's like a lifetime monthly recurring discount.”

Steal thisAggregate buyers in a niche vertical and negotiate lifetime recurring software discounts; the membership pays for itself many times over so churn is near zero.

Build Shopify for $100M+ D2C brands

Moiz Ali argues Shopify is great from $0-$50M but limiting above $100M, especially on checkout customization. He sees room for a platform built for brands big enough that a fractional conversion bump is worth millions, citing brands like Away and Ritual that left Shopify for custom stacks.

“I think there is room for somebody to come in and say, I'm going to build my own Shopify. I'm going to build Shopify, but for businesses doing north of $100 billion. And there's a lot of businesses doing north of $100 billion that have left Shopify, you know, Away Travel, Ritual Vitamins, because they're like, look, we've outgrown this platform.”

Steal thisTarget the 9-figure D2C tier with deep checkout-page customization, where a quarter-point conversion lift is worth tens of millions.

Native's post-purchase popup: $700K/mo in travel-size sales

Native's post-checkout popup offering travel-size deodorant sold roughly $700,000 of those units every month at about $400,000 net profit. Moiz Ali says it was only possible on WordPress, not Shopify at the time.

“we did a post-purchase pop-up at Native, which was after you click checkout, we showed you a pop-up saying buy travel size deodorant. We probably sold $700,000 of those travel size deodorants every single month. And made $400,000 in net profit off those travel-sized deodorants. And we could only do that in WordPress.”

Steal thisAdd a one-click post-purchase upsell of a cheap travel/trial SKU; the incremental margin can be enormous.

Clone the top 100 Shopify apps and charge a flat fee

Moiz Ali pitches cloning the most popular (and overpriced, revenue-percentage-based) Shopify apps and offering them at a flat ~$20-30/month, betting every new merchant defaults to the cheaper option over time.

“There's a massive business to be built here, which is cloning the top 100 Shopify apps and just charging a flat fee. Like, you know, it might be a longer-term business because you don't have a sales team and you're not going out calling everyone being like, switch from, you know, Yapow to me. But it is, uh, every single new business is going to go to you because it's way easier to use.”

Steal thisRebuild the most overpriced top Shopify apps at a flat monthly fee instead of a percentage of revenue, and let easier pricing win new merchants by default.

Real estate, unlike startups, should never need more cash

Moiz Ali rails against real estate Twitter operators who promised great returns on floating-rate debt, then asked LPs for more capital when rates rose. His rule: once you own the asset, the deal shouldn't require fresh cash, so a capital call is a red flag.

“Real estate is a business where once you own the asset, you should not need more cash. You're not like expanding the real estate anyway. You're operating an apartment building. The problem is what happens is when the interest rates go up and you have more debt to pay every single month because you're on a floating rate, you need more capital to be able to pay that debt because the rents don't service it.”

Buy the dip on Facebook: conviction from a $8K duplex

Moiz Ali kept buying Facebook stock as it crashed 50%, reasoning every D2C business depends on Facebook ads (he watches 25 ad accounts daily). His conviction traces to his father buying post-2008 real estate at deep discounts, including an $8,000 half-duplex that now rents for ~$1,900/month.

“there was one half duplex that he purchased for $8,000 and it generates like $1,900 in rent a month today. Within a year, we purchased back the entire duplex every single year. And he never lost conviction. He's like, this is a deal of a lifetime.”

Wealth managers are car salesmen who sell financial instruments

Moiz Ali's blunt verdict on wealth managers: their job isn't understanding markets, it's selling you an asset to earn fees. He says they'd tell you to refuse a free billion from Bill Gates rather than miss collecting fees on your dollar.

“the guys who are the wealth managers, their job is not to understand markets. Their job is to understand how to sell you an asset. They're just car salesmen who sell financial instruments rather than cars. And they're just as sleazy and just as slimy and just as charismatic as well.”

Native now does $500M/year under P&G

Moiz Ali sold Native to Procter & Gamble for ~$100M; Sam guessed it now does $200-300M, and Moiz reveals it's doing about $500 million in revenue this year.

“$500 this year.”

Native sold for $100M cash about 28 months after starting

Sam recounts watching Moïse Alli build the deodorant brand Native from nothing in the same office, then sell it for $100M in cash roughly 20-28 months after starting.

“and he started this deodorant company called Native, and 20 months after starting it, he sold it for $100 million in cash, or maybe 28 months.”

Native deodorant: natural in a stick, sold for $100M

Moiz Ali saw natural deodorant was a top seller on Etsy but sold messily in jars; he figured out how to deliver it in stick form for convenience and sold the business roughly 18 months later for $100 million.

“And he's like, look, people want— people want natural deodorant, but they want the convenience of the stick. If I could figure out how to put natural deodorant in a stick, I think I can make a business that works. And, uh, you know, 18 months later sells it for $100 million.”

'In 6 months I'll know everything about deodorant'

Shaan relays Suli's lesson via the Native Deodorant founder: not knowing the industry is the normal starting point. If you understand the problem and roughly what a solution looks like, you'll become an expert within months of diving in.

“He's like, he's like, oh, I don't think about that at all when it comes to business. He's like, when I start a business, of course I don't know anything about it. That's sort of just the starting point. But as long as I understand the problem and like the basics of what a solution might look like, I don't need to be a master of the solution.”

Steal thisDon't let domain ignorance stop you — pick the problem, then give yourself a crash course; expertise compounds fast once you dive in.

From a dining room table to a $100M Procter & Gamble exit in 2.5 years

Shaan sets up the episode: Moiz Ali built Native Deodorant as a one-man show from his brother's dining room table, raising almost no money because investors laughed him out of the room, then sold it to P&G for $100M just 2.5 years later.

“He was doing the packaging, he was doing the sales, the marketing, the customer service as a one-man show for a very, very long time. And over 2.5 years, he built this company raising very, very little money, mostly because investors were kind of just laughing him out of the room like, okay, you're starting a deodorant company? Like, what is that? And so he sold it 2.5 years later to Procter Gamble for $100 million.”

Find a product on your body 23 hours a day that you can't pronounce the ingredients of

Moiz's insight for Native came from flipping over an Axe stick and realizing he, an attorney, couldn't pronounce a single ingredient on a product that stays on his body nearly all day for decades. A pregnant sister worried about chemicals made it a real enough problem to solve.

“I flip over my deodorant and I can't pronounce a single ingredient on the back of that thing. Other than the word aluminum. And, you know, I've been seeing this problem for the last 4 years since I've been buying the deodorant from Duane Reade. And, you know, I'm an attorney. I'm not a dumb guy. I know how to read English, and I cannot pronounce a single one of these words.”

Steal thisLook for everyday products people keep on or in their body but can't read the label of — that's a wedge for a cleaner-ingredient brand.

The 'don't take a pill to stop peeing' pitch for ditching antiperspirant

Moiz reframes aluminum-based antiperspirant as unnatural: aluminum plugs your sweat glands like a duct. He sells deodorant-not-antiperspirant by analogy — you wouldn't take a pill to stop urinating, and most office workers don't sweat enough to need it anyway.

“And the way I always liken it is, look, if you could take a pill to make you stop urinating, would you take that pill? Doesn't that sound so weird? Like if your body is trying to expel a fluid from itself, shouldn't you let it?”

Steal thisWin a category by reframing the incumbent's core feature as something unnatural the customer never actually asked for.

Launched with one $12 sale on Product Hunt's page 2 and almost quit day one

Moiz launched Native 12 days after buying the domain with zero inventory, made by a mom-and-pop hobbyist. His Product Hunt launch landed on page 2, got a single sale, and he nearly killed the business — $12 a day, age 30.

“We get one sale and I'm like, okay, this business is over. Forget about like, I'm not going to do all this hard work to sell $12 of deodorant every day. I can open up a lemonade. Like, I'm 30 years old and I'm basically was having a revenue of $12 a day.”

A 3D-rendered product photo and a Product Hunt favor turned 1 sale into 51

With no physical product to photograph, Moiz used a 3D render of the deodorant bar and a bathroom hero image. A friend got him an exception to relaunch on Product Hunt's front page a second day in a row, producing 50 sales and validating the idea.

“So we got some guy to like 3D render the image of what a Native deodorant bar would look like. And like, that's the image that we have associated with Product Hunt. On our website, we have a hero image and the hero image is just a bathroom. It doesn't even have a photo of Native deodorant on it. Because no native deodorant exists at this point. But on that second day, we get like 50 sales”

Total launch budget: about $1,000

Moiz, self-described as the cheapest person in the world, started Native with roughly $1,000 of his own money — $500 to buy the first products and $500 on Google Ads, which initially returned only $100 in sales.

“Yeah, I'm the cheapest person in the world, so I probably spent like, um, a grand launching the business. So, uh, the first $500 was to buy products and the next $500 is to like buy Google Ads. And I'm buying Google Ads and I spend $500 and I get like $100 in, uh, of sales and I'm like, this is not working out well.”

A/B test a physical product by mailing formula variants and watching repeat-purchase rates

Native runs true A/B tests on a physical good: ship different baking-soda particle sizes to different customer cohorts, then compare reviews at 6 weeks and repeat-purchase rates at 12 weeks to decide which formula is objectively better.

“So we'll send, you know, the Shawns of one world baking soda that's milled to a certain particle size and Sams of the world, a baking soda that's milled to another particle size. And we'll, we'll monitor your reviews use 6 weeks after you purchase and your repeat purchase rates 12 weeks after you purchase and say, you know what, the Sams of the world are buying again more frequently than the Shauns of the world.”

Steal thisTreat a consumable like software — ship formula variants to cohorts and let repeat-purchase rate, not the lab, pick the winner.

From $100K/month to $1M/month in six months on a single product

Native scaled revenue from roughly $100K a month in May 2016 to $250K in June (when the first employee joined) and $1M a month by November 2016 — a 10x in five months while Moiz was still doing customer service himself.

“So she comes on board, we do $250K in revenue that month. So we've basically doubled the business between May in June, and the customer service inquiries have gotten to be even more than she can— she and I can handle together.”

The three compounding levers behind Native's snowball: word of mouth, ads, repeat rate

Moiz attributes the 10x ramp to three compounding forces: growing word of mouth at higher revenue, more ad spend once unit economics were proven, and a higher repeat-purchase rate — the most important one — creating a snowball effect.

“There's 3 things. One, word of mouth is growing a ton. Like, you know, it's, it's small. It's hard to have word of mouth when you're doing $50K a month. It's a lot easier to have word of mouth when you're doing $250K, $500K a month. So that's growing a ton. Two, we're spending more on ads because we understand product market fit and we understand that we're profitable when we spend money on ads. So we're spending more money on ads. And then 3, we have a higher repeat purchase rate, uh, which was the most important thing.”

Steal thisFor a consumable D2C brand, obsess over repeat-purchase rate first — it compounds with word of mouth and ad spend into a snowball.

Price by working backwards from all-in cost, not the competitor's price

Native's $12 price came from cost-plus math, not a market survey: ~$6 to make, ~$3 to ship, ~$1.50 for box and insert, an all-in cost over $11. Moiz had no choice but to charge $12 to avoid losing money on every order, despite competitors selling at $3-4.

“Like, early on, the deodorant cost us about $6 to make. It cost us, uh, $3 and some change to ship. And then it cost us like another $1.50 for random expenses, like the box and like a, you know, a card in there and a bunch of other expenses. So we were looking at an all-in cost of like $11 and some change. And so I was like, look, uh, I can't lose money on every deodorant I make.”

Steal thisSet your price by stacking real all-in unit costs first; let the floor justify a premium rather than anchoring to the incumbent's shelf price.

'If the natural deodorant industry is $30M a year, we ARE the entire industry'

An investor passed on Native because the whole natural deodorant category was only ~$30M/year (essentially Tom's of Maine). Moiz's retort: Native was already doing $30M a year, so it WAS the entire category — and the small TAM was the opportunity, not the risk.

“And I was like, if the natural deodorant industry is $30 million a year, we're the entire natural deodorant industry. We're doing $30 million a year. At this point. And so I think from, from our perspective, we were like, look, there's a lot of external factors that say we should not be doing this.”

Run your own M&A auction: invite all suitors, demand a sign-ready markup up front

Instead of a 90-day diligence process, Moiz ran the sale like The Bachelor — invited ~12-14 suitors to one office, handed over a thin data room, and told them to mark up the merger agreement and be ready to close the day they made an offer, leveraging one seller against many buyers.

“Now, we're a 2.5-year-old business. We barely have any contracts. You know, we have probably 3 material contracts, no change of control provisions. Like the whole— like there's very little data in the data data room. Yeah. And we say, go through all the data, here's a draft merger agreement, mark it up, give us an offer, and you should be ready to sign that. You should be ready to close that offer the day you give it to us.”

Steal thisWhen selling, create competitive tension by running a fast, multi-bidder process and demanding a sign-ready offer instead of an open-ended diligence period.

Sell the sizzle: an online-only brand's value is the channels the acquirer can unlock

Native sold only deodorant, only on its own site, only in the US. Moiz pitched acquirers on the upside they could add — selling into Target, expanding the product line, going to Canada — turning a narrow business into a story of unrealized distribution.

“And so one of the things that we sell is like the sizzle, right? We're like, look, if you, uh, you know how to sell in, you know, P&G, do you know how to sell into Target? If so, imagine how Native would do at Target. Do you know how to make other products with the word Native on them? Help us do that and we can make this a bigger business. Do you know how to sell in Canada? Great. This is going to be a bigger business.”

Steal thisPitch acquirers on the channels and SKUs THEY can unlock that you deliberately left untouched — sell the upside, not just the trailing numbers.

Native didn't own its own trademark until 5 days before the P&G sale

A trademark Native didn't own nearly sank the deal — P&G refused to buy until Native owned its mark. Moiz negotiated the purchase of his own trademark while negotiating the acquisition, closing on it November 3rd and selling the company November 8th.

“We simply didn't own our trademark. Yeah. Until 5 days before we sold the business. So we bought our trademark on like, we sold the business on like November 8th. On November 3rd, we purchased the trademark and that was the one thing that we still had to do in order to sell the business. Like P&G was like, we will not buy this business until you own your own trademark.”

Steal thisLock down your trademark early — an unowned mark can stall or kill an acquisition at the finish line.

Stop listening to other people, start listening to yourself

Moiz's core lesson: advisors told him to launch a second product, do influencer marketing, open pop-up stores, raise millions. He rejected all of it because the business was already working — nobody can talk to you for 20 minutes and out-think the founder who lives the business daily.

“Nobody's gonna be able to like come into your business, talk to you for 20 minutes and give you an amazing idea that you haven't thought of. People would be like, have you thought about influencer advertising? And I'm like, I only live and breathe this business every day.”

Steal thisWhen the business is already working, default to ignoring generic advice — double down on what's working instead of chasing every suggested tactic.

A $50K check turned into $1M — and the investor's best news the day his first kid was born

Moiz called early investor Wei Guo to sign sale docs; Wei had texted asking if it was urgent because his wife had just given birth to his first child. Learning his $50K became $1M, he said it was the best news he'd gotten all day. Moiz still found life barely changed despite owning ~90% of the company.

“So I call him up. I was like, we turned your $50K to $1 million. And he's like, fuck, this is awesome. You know, every— he's like, all these people in China told me I didn't understand American consumers. I'm gonna go back to them and show them this deal. Fuck them.”

Stay quiet while it works: do zero PR until after you exit

Moiz Ali did no press for Native until after selling to P&G. Even Bay Area investors three blocks away had never heard of the brand because the team deliberately kept it under the radar.

“In fact, we've done no PR for Native until after we sold the business. I remember we had all these news publications reaching out to us and I took one interview with— I think it was like Retail Dive or somebody.”

Steal thisRun your growing business in stealth: skip PR and chest-thumping until after the exit so competitors and copycats stay asleep.

Native WAS the entire natural deodorant category

An investor dismissed natural deodorant as a tiny $30M/year market. Moiz Ali's rebuttal: Native alone was already doing $30M a year, so they were the whole category.

“the investor was like, the entire natural deodorant industry is something like $30 million a year. So why would anyone be interested in investing in a category that only has $30 million a year run rates? And I was like, if the natural deodorant industry is $30 million a year, We're the entire natural deodorant industry. We're doing $30 million a year at this point.”

The 'would you take a pill to stop peeing?' pitch for natural deodorant

Moiz Ali's core marketing frame: aluminum plugs sweat glands like a duct. He argues you wouldn't take a pill to stop urinating, so why block a natural bodily function with an antiperspirant.

“the way I always liken it is, look, if you could take a pill to make you stop urinating, would you take that pill? Doesn't that sound so weird? Like if your body is trying to expel a fluid from itself, shouldn't you let it?”

Steal thisReframe your product against the incumbent by exposing how unnatural the default behavior is, using a vivid everyday analogy.

Launched on Product Hunt page 2, got ONE sale, almost quit

Native launched with no inventory and only contracted small mom-and-pop manufacturers. Landing on page 2 of Product Hunt, it got a single $12 sale and Moiz Ali nearly killed the company on day one.

“We get one sale and I'm like, okay, this business is over. Forget about— like, I'm not going to do all this hard work to sell $12 of deodorant every day. I can open up a lemonade— like, I'm 30 years old and I'm basically having a revenue of $12 a day, right?”

NatureBox and Instacart were just repackaging Whole Foods

Ali notes NatureBox's original model was buying snacks at Whole Foods, repackaging them, and shipping to your house with no ingredient difference, and Instacart simply shopped your emailed grocery list. Simple, non-groundbreaking ideas built huge businesses.

“Their original business model was we're going to go buy this at Whole Foods, put it in different size packaging and just ship it to your house. Like, you know, What's the difference between this and Whole Foods trail mix? Literally no packaging difference, no ingredient difference. They literally go and buy it and ship it to your house. And that was it.”

Manscaped won by re-targeting an existing product at a new use

Ali explains Manscaped's edge: the same trimmer works on your face, but branding it specifically for a new use plus bold stunts (a barge off South Beach reading "Got bush? Use Manscaped") got attention that DTC billboards never did.

“they had a barge sail up and down South Beach in Miami and they had a big billboard on it and it said, "Got bush? Use Manscaped." Like they've done really unique things in order to get their name out there in a way that I think a lot of other direct-to-consumer businesses have failed where we're like, you know, Native would run billboards and we're like, "Here's an aluminum-free deodorant, please come buy it." It really didn't get your attention.”

Started Native for roughly $1,000 total

Self-described as the cheapest person in the world, Moiz Ali launched Native on about a grand: $500 on initial product and $500 on Google Ads, where $500 of spend returned only $100 in sales.

“I probably spent like a grand launching the business. So the first $500 was to buy products and the next $500 is to like buy Google Ads and I'm buying Google Ads and I spend $500 and I get like $100 of sales and I'm like, this is not working out well.”

Track every single ad daily in a spreadsheet to learn Facebook ads

Moiz Ali got good at Facebook ads by logging every ad's click-through rate, CPA, and ROI in an Excel sheet every single day, finding product-market fit on Facebook after Google Ads failed.

“I created this Excel spreadsheet where every day I tracked every single ad I had, the click-through rate, the, you know, CPA, the return on investment. And I start doing that every day starting, you know, probably August 2015 or maybe September 2015. And like that's really how I started getting good at Facebook ads. I was tracking every single ad we ran on a daily basis.”

Steal thisLog every ad's CTR, CPA, and ROI in a spreadsheet daily until you internalize what works.

Native hit a ~$50M run rate with only 8 employees

Ali says Native was at roughly a $50M run rate with 8 people when he sold; by the time he left it was doing north of $100M a year with about 30 people. He contrasts this with founders running 20 people on $2-4M.

“we were at a $50 million run rate or close to a $50 million run rate when we sold the business and we had 8 people at the time. And when I left, you know, it was certainly doing north of $100 million a year. And, you know, we probably had 30 or so people on the team.”

Native hit a ~$50M run rate with only 8 employees

Ali says Native was at roughly a $50M run rate with 8 people when he sold; by the time he left it was doing north of $100M a year with about 30 people. He contrasts this with founders running 20 people on $2-4M.

“we were at a $50 million run rate or close to a $50 million run rate when we sold the business and we had 8 people at the time. And when I left, you know, it was certainly doing north of $100 million a year. And, you know, we probably had 30 or so people on the team.”

Native hand-poured 21,000 deodorants a day, up from 500 a week

Native hand-poured every bar with about 100 workers in Austin; the best person could pour ~1,000 a day, a new hire ~75. The operation scaled from 500 units a week to 21,000 a day, still hand-pouring.

“we went from 500 units of deodorant a week to 21,000 a day, still hand pouring. So it was more scalable than I thought it was going to be.”

Native hand-poured 21,000 deodorants a day, up from 500 a week

Native hand-poured every bar with about 100 workers in Austin; the best person could pour ~1,000 a day, a new hire ~75. The operation scaled from 500 units a week to 21,000 a day, still hand-pouring.

“we went from 500 units of deodorant a week to 21,000 a day, still hand pouring. So it was more scalable than I thought it was going to be.”

A/B test physical product formulas using repeat-purchase rate as the verdict

Native sends different formula variants (e.g. baking soda milled to different particle sizes) to swaths of customers, then judges which is better by repeat purchase rates at 12 weeks rather than lab tests.

“we'll send, you know, the Shauns of one of the one world, baking soda that's milled to a certain particle size, and Sams of the world, a baking soda that's milled to another particle size. And we'll, we'll monitor your reviews 6 weeks after you purchase and your repeat purchase rates 12 weeks after you purchase and say, you know what, the Sams of the world are buying again more frequently than the Shauns of the world. And as a result, it must be that the formula that we sent to the Sams of the world are better.”

Steal thisA/B test physical product variants across customer cohorts and let repeat-purchase rate, not a lab, decide the winner.

Shopify is arming the rebels with muskets in a nuclear war

Having lost millions on Shopify stock, Ali argues the platform under-equips merchants, letting third-party apps capture spend it should own; he framed the gap as giving rebels muskets in a nuclear war.

“Shopify keeps, uh, their, their, uh, their motto is to arm the rebels. And I said they keep giving us muskets in a war that's being fought with like nuclear weapons.”

$100K/month in revenue, only ~$8K in net profit

At roughly 10-11 months, Native was selling $100K of deodorant a month as a solo operation, but with no economies of scale the company only netted about $8,000 in profit on that revenue.

“I'd say on $100,000 in business, I'm guessing, cuz I don't really remember, I'd say the company probably made about $8,000 in net profit, right? Uh, selling $100,000 of deodorant.”

A $600K fourplex underwritten at $800/unit now rents for $1,400

Ali bought ~50 units from Feb 2020 to end of 2021, underwriting 6% returns that became 12-14%. One fourplex bought for $600,000 with expected $800/unit rents now rents each unit for about $1,400.

“I bought a fourplex for $600,000. I thought each unit would rent out for like $800. They're each renting out for about $1,400 now.”

The snowball: word of mouth, ad spend, and repeat purchase compounding

Native went from $100K to $1M/month on three compounding forces: growing word of mouth, more ad spend justified by proven product-market fit, and a higher repeat purchase rate (the most important).

“There's 3 things. One, word of mouth is growing a ton. Like, you know, it's, it's small. It's hard to have word of mouth when you're doing $50K a month. It's a lot easier to have word of mouth when you're doing $250K, $500K a month. So that's growing a ton. Two, we're spending more on ads because we understand product market fit and we understand that we're profitable when we spend money on ads. So we're spending more money on ads. And then three, we have a higher repeat purchase rate, uh, which was the most important thing.”

Steal thisFor consumables, obsess over repeat-purchase rate; it compounds with word of mouth and ad spend into a snowball.

Backwards pricing: $11 all-in cost forced the $12 price tag

Native priced at $12 by working backwards from cost: ~$6 to make, ~$3 to ship, ~$1.50 for box and inserts, an all-in cost over $11, so $12 was the floor to avoid losing money on every order.

“early on, the deodorant cost us about $6 to make. It cost us, $3 and some change to ship. And then it cost us like another $1.50 for random expenses like the box and like a, you know, a card in there and a bunch of other expenses. So we were looking at an all-in cost of like $11 and some change. And so I was like, look, uh, I can't lose money on every deodorant I make. I'm not brandless, so I have to charge $12.”

Steal thisSet price by stacking every all-in unit cost first, then pricing above it; never sell below your loaded cost.

Buying houses at auction sight-unseen, then picking the locks

Ali buys real estate at auction with no inspection or financing, wiring money the next day and discovering the condition only after. One house still held the deceased owner's cars, forks, and a safe; others needed $40K of unbudgeted roof or kitchen work.

“a bunch of the real estate I bought is like an auction. And so when you walk, there's no inspection, there's no financing ability. You bid on an auction, you wire the money the next day, and then you open the house and you're like, what did I just get into?”

Run your own M&A auction: mark up the merger agreement, be ready to sign on day one

With 12-14 suitors and a 2.5-year-old company, Moiz forced an aggressive process: here's all the diligence, mark up a draft merger agreement, give us an offer, and be ready to close the day you hand it over.

“Here's a draft merger agreement, mark it up, give us an offer, and you should be ready to sign that. You should be ready to close that offer the day you give it to us. And, you know, look, that's really aggressive. Incredibly aggressive. We're basically like, look, we've got— we've got this awesome business. You want it. There's a bunch of you guys. There's one of us, right?”

Steal thisWhen many buyers want you, compress the process: hand over diligence and a draft agreement, and demand a sign-ready offer.

Sell the sizzle: 'imagine how Native would do at Target'

Native sold only deodorant, only online, only in the US. Moiz pitched acquirers on the upside they could unlock, retail distribution at Target, new Native-branded products, expansion into Canada.

“one of the things that we sell is like the sizzle, right? We're like, look, if you, uh, you know how to sell in, you know, P&G, do you know how to sell into Target? If so, imagine how Native would do at Target. Do you know how to make other products with the word Native on them? Help us do that and we can make this a bigger business. Do you know how to sell in Canada? Great. This is gonna be a bigger business. So we sell that sizzle.”

Steal thisSell acquirers the upside only they can unlock, distribution, line extensions, new geographies, not just your current numbers.

Native didn't own its own trademark until 5 days before the P&G sale

A trademark Native didn't own delayed the entire sale; P&G refused to buy until Native owned its mark. They bought it on Nov 3rd and closed the deal on Nov 8th, negotiating with the owner down to the wire.

“we had a trademark issue until we sold the business. This was a serious part, like, that delayed the transaction with everybody and that I think made it harder for us to sell the business. We simply didn't own our trademark. Yeah. Uh, until 5 days before we sold the business. So we bought our trademark on, like, we sold the business on, like, November 8th. On November 3rd, we purchased the trademark, and that was the one thing that we still had to do in order to sell the business.”

Steal thisLock down your trademark and core IP early; an unowned mark can stall or sink an acquisition at the finish line.

Stop listening to other people, start listening to yourself

Moiz Ali's core lesson: advisors told him to launch a second product, do influencer ads, open pop-ups, and raise millions. He rejected it all and doubled down on what was already working in his business.

“stop listening to other people. And start listening to yourself. I remember when we were growing the business, people were like, look, you're not gonna be able to sell this until you launch a second product outside of deodorant that really is a home run again.”

Steal thisWhen something is working, double down on it and politely reject well-meaning advice that pulls you off course.

Turned a $50K check into $1M, controlled 97% of the company at exit

Native raised only ~$500K total, so Moiz and his family controlled ~97% of the company at the $100M sale. His first investor, Weigo, saw his $50K turn into $1M on the same day his first child was born.

“I was like, we turned your $50K to $1 million. And he's like, fuck, this is awesome. You know, he's like, all these people in China told me I didn't understand American consumers.”

If starting at 21 with no money: dropship arbitrage off Alibaba to Amazon

Asked what he'd do at 21 with no resources, Moiz Ali says start dropshipping: find a product on Alibaba, sell it for more in the US on Amazon, and arbitrage the difference to learn e-commerce with no capital at risk.

“if I had no resources, I would say start dropshipping something. Find something that on Alibaba that you can purchase and sell more in the United States on Amazon or some something else and arbitrage that difference. I've seen so many people do that and so many people do that well, and that's a great way to get your feet wet into e-commerce and understand what's going on without having any personal capital at risk.”

Steal thisStart with no-capital dropship arbitrage, buy on Alibaba, sell higher on Amazon, to learn e-commerce risk-free.

"I use it and I'll be an expert in 6 months"

When challenged that he knew nothing about deodorant before starting Native, Ali's answer was that he used the product and would be an expert in six months, which Shaan calls the attitude that lets you start anything.

“It was the husband of one of my close friends who's like, you don't know anything. I was like, I use it and I'll be an expert in 6 months. Give it, give me 6 months.”

Steal thisDon't wait to be an expert to start; commit to six months of obsessive learning and begin now.