Number
Blab died at 10% monthly active: 4M users, 400K active
Shaan reveals Blab hit 4.5M total users in ~16 months but only ~400,000 were monthly active. A ~10% active rate told them the app would not work.
$10
Monthly active user rate · percent
“US has 4 million users, and I think on a monthly basis we had 400,000 active. That's why we knew this is not going to work, because 10% of your user base being active every month is too low.”
Number
Blab died at 10% monthly active: 4M users, 400K active
Shaan reveals Blab hit 4.5M total users in ~16 months but only ~400,000 were monthly active. A ~10% active rate told them the app would not work.
$10
Monthly active user rate · percent
“US has 4 million users, and I think on a monthly basis we had 400,000 active. That's why we knew this is not going to work, because 10% of your user base being active every month is too low.”
Billy
Martin Shkreli drove Blab's traffic 10x as its biggest user
Shaan recounts how the banned-from-Twitch Martin Shkreli became Blab's biggest user, bringing in hundreds of thousands of people a month, streaming up to 10 hours a day, fighting haters in the morning and doing live stock-picking 'educational' streams in the afternoon.
“So he starts bringing on hundreds of thousands of people per month just through his channel, which like we had like Tony Robbins came on, the Jonas Brothers came on, ESPN was using us. Nobody could drive numbers like this guy. And not just that he drove people to come check it out, like come check out the car crash, but he actually used us like 10 hours a day. Like in the morning he would log on, he would start the room, his like kind of fans and haters would come in.”
Story
Why Blab died: two audiences that never coexisted
Shaan diagnoses Blab's failure: celebrities used it ~1 hour a week (legit but couldn't fill 24/7), while hangout users were on 40 hours a week but brought no friends because their value was making new friends. The two groups never overlapped or grew the platform.
“The celebrities grew, but were totally, you know, using it 1 hour a week. The people using it 40 hours a week brought no friends. And then those 2 groups did not coexist at all. They didn't even understand why the hell they're on the platform. And so that was the problem that we were never able to solve and why we ended up pivoting.”
Take
Don't wait until you're rich — think of yourself as an investor on day one
Shaan's biggest angel-investing lesson: the excuse 'I don't have capital' is false. If you're resourceful and persuasive enough, you can access other people's capital, so start treating yourself as an investor immediately rather than waiting to be wealthy.
“the number one advice I would give to you is don't wait until you're rich to do it. Because at that point, you know, the financial returns, it will just be a part of a broader portfolio. It's not going to be that exciting. But if you really want to do this, start thinking of yourself as an investor from day one and find ways to access the capital.”
Steal thisDecide you're an investor before you have money, then go source capital from people who want deal flow.
Story
Sam's Blab postmortem: 4M users, didn't work, told copycats to consider porn
Sam's live-streaming startup Blab reached 4 million users but had to pivot and ultimately failed. When copycat founders cite his postmortem, he tells them the straight version won't work and to consider the cam-girl angle they never explored.
“Then I've had a bunch of entrepreneurs reach out being like, hey, we saw you did Blab, we read your postmortem, You guys got to 4 million users, but it didn't work. I have a very similar concept. I think it's going to work. Can you give me some advice? And I tell them from the bat, jump. I'm like, this version is not going to work. Consider porn. I think it could work. Consider the camgirl angle because, you know, that's the one stone we didn't turn when we were considering, you know, where to pivot this thing to make it.”
Story
Why Blab failed: live content's fatal flaw
Shaan's startup Blab let anyone push a button and start a live talk show. It failed partly because live entertainment is exponentially harder than recorded: with live, the good stuff is only good while it's on, then it's gone, so you need great content broadcasting all the time.
“With live, you have this really hard problem where the good stuff is only good while it's on, and then as soon as they go offline, it's gone. So it's like exponentially harder to have good entertainment on all the time. And we, we felt that pain. And so ultimately that's why it failed.”